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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
WISCONSIN AND ITS ADMINISTRATION OF
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
DEAN MAx SCHOaETz, JR., B.A., LL.B.
The Workmen's Compensation act has been a law in Wisconsin
for eleven years.1 The Industrial Commission of Wisconsin has
successfully interpreted and administered the act. The purpose
of this article is to briefly review some of the fundamental cases
decided by our Supreme Court with reference to the administra-
tion of the Compensation act.
LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
When the act was first passed it was deemed to be uncon-
stitutional because it was alleged it delegated to the Industrial
Commission judicial and legislative powers, the opponents of the
measure arguing that modem political analysis divided the powers
of government into three great departments, I the legislative, 2
the executive, 3 the judiciary, and modem constitutional govern-
ment has decreed a considerable separation of these departments
to prevent abuses. 2 It was found, however, that an absolute
separation of these departments is impracticable because the
departments are but different aspects of one government and are
closely connected at many points. The same argument was
launched against the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin. 3 But
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustained the constitutionality of
the Railroad Commission and stated that the division of govern-
mental powers into executive, legislative and judicial, while of
great importance in the creation or organization of a state, and
from the viewpoint of constitutional law and otherwise, is not an
exact classification. No such exact delineation of governmental
powers is possible. In the process of enacting a law there is
frequently necessary the preliminary determination of a fact, or
group of facts, by -the legislature, and it is well settled that the
legislature may declare the general rule of law to be in force and
take effect upon the subsequent establishment of the facts neces-
sary to make it operative or to call for its application; as the
bankruptcy law of the United States with reference to legislative
action regarding exemption laws existing or to be -thereafter en-
acted; or the law may be made to take effect conditionally, depend-
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ing upon the action of the legislature of another state fixing the
amount to be exacted; or it may be conditioned upon the legis-
lative act of a city council, or upon action of the executive, or
upon judicial action involving the determination of questions of
fact; or upon administrative action; or upon a declaration of
fact, or the creation of a condition by vote of the electors of a
municipality. This power to ascertain facts by the Railroad
Commission is such a power as may be delegated. So statutes de-
claring that railroad rates and service shall be reasonable and
creating a commission with power to investigate existing rates and
what services are reasonable, the statute then providing that the
rates and service so fixed shall be in force, was held as a valid
exercise of the legislative power.
The constitutionality of the Industrial Commission was also
sustained as constitutional.4 In the attack the contention was
made that the law was unconstitutional because it vests judicial
power in a body which is not a court. The Court pointed out
that it is not a delegation of judicial power but that the Industrial
Commission is an administrative body, or arm of the Govern-
ment, which in -the course of its administration of a law is
empowered to ascertain some question of fact and to apply the ex-
isting law thereto, and in so doing acts quasi judicially, but it is
not thereby vested with judicial power in the constitutional sense.
There are many such administrative bodies or commissions, and
with the increasing complexity of modern government they seem
likely to increase rather than diminish. Examples may be easily
thought of, town boards, boards of health, boards of review,
boards of equalization, railroad rate commissions and public
utility commissions, all come within this class. They perform
very important duties in our scheme of government, but they are
not legislatures or courts. The legislative branch of the Govern-
ment, by statute, determines the rights, duties and liabilities of
persons and corporations under certain conditions of fact, vary-
ing as the facts and conditions change. Manifestly, the legis-
lature cannot remain in session and pass a new act upon every
change of condition, but it may, and does, commit to an admini-
strative board the duty of ascertaining-when the facts exist which
call into activity certain provisions of the law-when conditions
have changed so as to call into activity other provisions. The
law is made by the legislature; -the facts upon which its operation
is dependant are ascertained by the administrative board. While
38
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acting within the scope of its duty, or its jurisdiction, as it is
sometimes called, such a board may lawfully be endowed with
very broad powers and its conclusions may be given great dignity
and force so that courts may not reverse them unless the proof
be clear and satisfactory that they are wrong. The jurisdiction
of the Industrial Commission rests upon certain facts which
must exist, first, that both employer and employee are subject to
the act and, second, that the injury was received in service growing
out of, or incidental to, the employment, as the result of accident
and not of willful misconduct. The Industrial Commission must,
of course, decide these questions in any case where they are
raised, but it cannot decide them for their jurisdictional question
on which its right to act at all depends. True, it says that the
findings of fact made by the Commission shall, in the absence of
fraud, be conclusive, but it provides for an action in the Circuit
Court for Dane County, in which the Board's award may be set
aside upon either of three grounds: namely, I, that the Board
acted without, or in excess of, its power; 2, that -the award was
procured by fraud; and 3, that the findings of fact do not support
the award. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin regarded the ex-
pressions as substantially the equivalent, or at least as inclusive
as the expressions, "without, or in excess of, its jurisdiction," and
with this construction the Court said that it is certain that the con-
stitutional powers of the courts have not been invaded.
THE PURPOSE OF THE COMPENSATION ACT
After an unsuccessful attempt was made to have the Industrial
Commission and Workmen's Compensation Act declared uncon-
stitutional, an effort was made so to construe its provisions as to
largely defeat its purpose. In the case of Miller vs. Milwaukee,
154 Wis., 652, -the Supreme Court of Wisconsin appreciated this
effort and recognized the principle that a law however much
needed for the promotion of the public welfare, and however
wisely framed, may be made so unsatisfactory by the spirit of
it not sufficiently pervading its administration, as to largely defeat
its purpose and create danger of its abrogation, and a return to
the distressing situation which gave rise to the effort for relief.
The Court emphatically declared that such a narrow construction
would be a public calamity, and warned everyone in authority,
having to do with determining the precise scope of the act in letter
39
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and spirit and applying it, to be alert at all times to the importance
of not affording any reason to admit such result, and of making
the wisdom embodied in the legislation so significant that no con-
siderate person would indulge the thought of even a partial back-
ward step toward the old system, characterized by incalculable
waste to the detriment of every consumer of the products of
human energy; by distressing, unequal distribution of misfor-
tunes incident to necessary industrial pursuits, particularly misfor-
tunes to employees by personal injury losses; by a lowering
tendency of moral standards in the making and enforcing claims
for such losses and by perversion of human perceptions of individ-
ual responsibility in such cases. The court also recognized that
the law was a long step toward an ideal system requiring every
consumer of any product of human industry, as directly as practi-
cable, to pay his ratable proportion of the fair money cost of
those things which he necessarily, or reasonably, destroys in con-
serving his life and welfare-personal injury losses, not inten-
tionally incurred-losses, whether through the fault of the
employer or employee, or without fault of either, being considered
as legitimately an element of such fair money cost as expenditures
for raw material, for machinery or wages. The administrative
commission and the courts were warned to fully appreciate that
and be imbued with, and guided by, the manifest intent of the
law; to utterly eradicate the injustice to employers and employees
and the public as well, of the old system, and to substitute in its
place an entirely new one, based on the highest conception of man's
humanity to man and obligation to industry upon which all
depend; recognizing the aggregate of its attending accidents as
an element of cost to be liquidated and balanced in money in the
course of consumption; a system dealing with employees, em-
ployers and the public as necessarily mutual participants in bear-
ing the burdens of such accidents, displacing the one dealing only
with the class of injuries happening through inadvertent failure,
without real moral turpitude, to exercise average human care,
and placing employee and employer, whose interests are economi-
cally the same, in the false position of adversaries, to the misfor-
tune of both; and the public, intensified by opportunity for those
concerned as judicial assistants, to profit by such misfortunes.
"Most lamentable," the Court said, "it would be if this new
system-so freighted with hopes for the minimizing of human
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burdens, and their equitable distribution-shall not endure and be
perfected to the best that human wisdom can attain."
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACT
In the light of the above purpose the Supreme Court early laid
down -the rule that that was the atmosphere, so to speak, in which
the question of statutory construction should be examined, the
conditions giving rise to a law, -the faults to be remedied, the
aspirations evidently intended to be efficiently embodied in the
enactment, and the effects and consquences, as regards respond-
ing to the prevailing conceptions of the necessities of public wel-
fare, play an important part in shaping the proper administration
of the legislation. "In -the aggregate," the Court said, "they
sometimes shed very efficient light in aid of clearing up obscurities
as to the legislative intent." Then follows a long line of cases
by our Supreme Court construing the Workmen's Compensation
Act in a broad, liberal light, to the end that the beneficent purposes
of the act might be fully carried out.5
The ordinary rule as to construing legislation in derogation to
the common law strictly against a purpose to change it, has little
or no application to legislative efforts to create a new system for
dealing with personal injuries to employees, such as the Work-
men's Compensation Law.6 While a practical construction of the
Workmen's Compensation Act by the Industrial Commission
might be of weight where the terms of -the act are doubtful, a
practical construction long adhered to cannot override the plain
terms of the act.7
ExTRA TERRITORIAL EFFECT
Where an employee resides in the state, and is in the employ of
an employer having a residence in the state, but is injured in an-
other state while on his way to such state to work, the liability of
the employer is to be determined by the Workmen's Compensation
Act of Wisconsin. The liability of the employer under the act
being statutory, the act enters into and becomes a part of every
contract, not as a covenant thereof, but to the extent that
the law of the land is a part of every contract just as -the Law of
Negotiable Instruments is a part of every promissory note to the
extent that the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto must be
determined with reference to the law of the place where the
promissory note is made, executed and delivered; so the rights
41
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and liabilities of every employer and employee who enter into a
contract of employment within this state must be determined
with reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court
held that the Workmen's Compensation Act of Wisconsin is so
far a part of every contract of employment that the rights and
liabilities of the parties thereto' in case of injury to the employee,
both being subject to it, must be determined in accordance with
its provisions, whether such injuries occur within or without the
state.8
EXCLUSIVENESS OF REMEDY
The liability provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act is
in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, and the remedy under
it is exclusive.9
PROCEDURE BEFORE INDUSTRIAL COM MISSION
The Industrial Commission is not a court, but merely an
administrative body.10 Having determined that the Industrial
Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter, the procedure
before the Commission is not hampered by useless formalities nor
technicalities."-
The right to object to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Com-
mission is not waived by appearing before it.12
The same strict rule with respect to rulings on the admission
of evidence as courts of law are not followed before the Industrial
Commission. 13 The Commission may even take ex parte evidence,
but such evidence becomes a public record and either party may
examine the same, and the law clearly contemplates that the
parties shall have the right to meet any new matter in such
ex parte evidence. 14
The Commission may ascertain facts pertaining to the accident
by referring to the report of the accident made by the employer
even though at the hearing such report is not formally introduced in
evidence.' , The Industrial Commission is not necessarily bound
by the testimony of experts merely because of their special
knowledge, but have a right, and it is their duty, to apply their
own common sense and experience to the situation presented.' 6
FINDINGS AND EFFECT OF DECISIONS
The Industrial Commission can make no award unless it is sup-
ported by findings of fact."
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In the absence of fraud, findings of fact made by the Industrial
Commission are conclusive and its decision cannot be set aside
except upon the grounds, (I) that it acted without, or in excess
of, its powers; (2) that it was procured by fraud; or (3) that its
findings of fact do not support the order of award. The findings
of the Industrial Commission on questions of fact will not be
disturbed if there is a substantial basis for their decision.'
The party is bound by a decision of the Industrial Commission
if he fails to appeal therefrom whether such decision is right or
wrong.19
The Industrial Commission may modify its award because of
a mistake,2 0 and such right is not suspended by the bringing of an
action to review such award.
APPEALS FROM DECISION OF THE COMMISSION
An action for review of the Industrial Commission's award
must be commenced within twenty days from the date of the
order or award and the provisions of the Statute must be pursued
closely.2' To comply with the Statute on Appeals it is necessary
that the summons and complaint in such an action for the review
of the award be served on the adverse party within the twenty
days limited by the Statute,2  and such service must be made on
the applicant as well as on the Commission.
The findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission must
have some support in the evidence and such evidence must be
made a part of the record that is returned to the Circuit Court
for review. 24 Recourse may be had to supply a defect in the
findings of the Industrial Commission to a memorandum made
by the Commission as a basis for its formal findings.25
POWER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IN THE REvIEw
The Circuit Court considers the case upon the record submitted
by the Industrial Commission, and evidence may be taken by the
Circuit Court upon an appeal from an award when the award is
attacked for fraud, and this is the only ground on which the
Circuit Court can consider any facts not found in the record as
returned.2 6 The Circuit Court may remand to the Industrial
Commission the entire record for further proceedings. 27 The
Court may set aside the award or may confirm the action of the
Industrial Commission. 28
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REVIEW BY SUPREME COURT
Any party aggrieved by a judgment entered upon in review
or award of the Industrial Commission may appeal therefrom to
the Supreme Court of this state.29 The function of the Supreme
Court upon an appeal from the Circuit Court is simply to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to afford jurisdic-
tion to make the findings complained of by the Industrial
Commission. 0
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